It now appears the world will force a run off in the Afghan election. That is what the world says is necessary, what the opposition says is necessary. But what do the people of Afghanistan say? Little I am sure, based on cultural and historical precedents.
They expected the election to be rigged, they expected Karzai to win. And that is what happened. As far as they are concerned, he remains the Mayor of Kabul. He has little sway over the rank and file, they gave up on him long ago.
Should we be concerned about the legitimacy of the election? To some, and most Afghans, not really. We need to be more in tune with the needs and wants of the population. And they are little enamored with Central Governments. Historically they have gained little from any central government (unless they were of the tribe).
Is a strong legitimate government necessary to defeat the Taliban? I think not. Rather, providing some semblence of security would be better, I think most Afghans would agree. But that means starting in the villages and working our way upwards. This is not something we are willing to do after eight years.
Unless we do, we will end up on the outside. We have the know how and the ability. We must now move to implementation. We must provide the Afghan with justice, we must provide the Afghan with the ability to live his life. We must not make him live it according to our standards, that is an option where we will surely fail.
Monday, October 19, 2009
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Afghanistan - An IO Strategy
As the complexity of Afghanistan is forcing a relook at the strategy, I think it is time to review our Information Operations (IO) effort.
As with combat, we need to rethink and realign our efforts. I am proposing the following three point strategy:
1. We need to have a strategy that operates at the National level, an effort to move the current government toward legitimacy. This includes the reduction of corruption, a main issue with the rural population.
2. We need to have a strategy that operates at the village/district level, one that is designed to stabilize the rural population and allow redevelopment efforts to bear fruit.
3. We need to have a strategy that operates at the operational level, one designed to target the "Taliban".
This three pronged effort must be synchronized across the spectrum and must move forward quickly or it may be impossible to reverse the tide of events within Afghanistan.
As with combat, we need to rethink and realign our efforts. I am proposing the following three point strategy:
1. We need to have a strategy that operates at the National level, an effort to move the current government toward legitimacy. This includes the reduction of corruption, a main issue with the rural population.
2. We need to have a strategy that operates at the village/district level, one that is designed to stabilize the rural population and allow redevelopment efforts to bear fruit.
3. We need to have a strategy that operates at the operational level, one designed to target the "Taliban".
This three pronged effort must be synchronized across the spectrum and must move forward quickly or it may be impossible to reverse the tide of events within Afghanistan.
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
The Future of Information Operations
As we begin to look at the sun set on military efforts in South Asia and the Middle East, the question of what comes next arises. For the Information Operations community, the Regional Commands have already transitioned to self support, with limited outside help from the Services. The former Joint support capability is not as necessary for the day to day operations as was in the past. There was a time limit on this capability and its time is short.
Does that mean there is no need for a Joint capability? The answer is NO. It is time for the Joint capability to mature and evolve. It must shed its apron strings to the operational aspect of Information Operations and begin to provide guidance for the future. What is the state of affairs in South Asia after Afghanistan? What is the impact of the Somali insurgents renewing their ties to Al Qaida? Where is Burma going?
These are just a small fraction of questions that must be addressed by Global Commands as well as the Regional Commands. Who is currently doing this? No one. It needs to be done if we are to plan for the future. Information Operations must also be integrated at the Inter-Agency level.
The most logical step would be the creation of a Joint Inter-Agency Planning Center, a think tank with a small footprint that task organizes to address emerging issues.
Does that mean there is no need for a Joint capability? The answer is NO. It is time for the Joint capability to mature and evolve. It must shed its apron strings to the operational aspect of Information Operations and begin to provide guidance for the future. What is the state of affairs in South Asia after Afghanistan? What is the impact of the Somali insurgents renewing their ties to Al Qaida? Where is Burma going?
These are just a small fraction of questions that must be addressed by Global Commands as well as the Regional Commands. Who is currently doing this? No one. It needs to be done if we are to plan for the future. Information Operations must also be integrated at the Inter-Agency level.
The most logical step would be the creation of a Joint Inter-Agency Planning Center, a think tank with a small footprint that task organizes to address emerging issues.
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Chuck Spinney
Chuck Spinney has a well written article on some of the obstacles facing Western efforts in Afghanistan. This, and a number of others, suggest that a major revision is needed in military efforts in the country. This is supposed to occur under General McChrystal. However, in a recent discussion with individuals that are looking at crafting an Information Operations support plan, I am not seeing his desires translated very well.
The focus must be at the lowest level, that is the village/district. To continue a top down approach as envisioned by these folks, will not satisfy the General's requirement. He is also pushing to have the plan at the lowest possible classification level, that is unclassified, and resistance is building there also. They believe it is ludicrous that it can be done at an unclassified level.
And thus, while there is new thinking at the top, there is old blood below.
Spinney Post:
www.counterpunch.org/spinney07142009.html
Chuck Spinney has a well written article on some of the obstacles facing Western efforts in Afghanistan. This, and a number of others, suggest that a major revision is needed in military efforts in the country. This is supposed to occur under General McChrystal. However, in a recent discussion with individuals that are looking at crafting an Information Operations support plan, I am not seeing his desires translated very well.
The focus must be at the lowest level, that is the village/district. To continue a top down approach as envisioned by these folks, will not satisfy the General's requirement. He is also pushing to have the plan at the lowest possible classification level, that is unclassified, and resistance is building there also. They believe it is ludicrous that it can be done at an unclassified level.
And thus, while there is new thinking at the top, there is old blood below.
Spinney Post:
www.counterpunch.org/spinney07142009.html
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Afghanistan
There are a great many solutions bantered about for solving Afghan's problems. Few are rooted in the good of the public. Unless the needs of the populace are addressed, failure looms on the horizon.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)