Reading List - Obscure Books

How Real is Real?

Paul Watzlawick

An older book that focuses on communications and the construct of reality. As noted very early in the book, communication creates reality. This is quickly followed by the statement that the most dangerous delusion is there is only one reality. The truth is, there are many versions of reality, some which contradict one another.

The book then goes on to develop this theme, providing evidence that the misunderstandings resulting from poor communications results in two people understanding the same event completely differently.

Examples are frequently provided and the topic is well investigated. A number of these examples I have experienced first hand and can attest to their validity.

So what does this have to do with IO? IO is communications, providing your target audience with information in an effort to influence their decisions. If the communications is poorly done, the translations faulty or the audience not understood,your IO effort will fail.

1. Communications poorly done - the written word suffers the lack of inflection and thus when creating a written IO product it will most likely miss its mark. The emphasis on pronunciation is not available and the reader will put it where he feels it needs to be. This is often complications by the next issue, poor translations.

2. Poor translations - a language is not without both external and internal influences. Regional dialects may change the meaning of a word, or in fact, the usage of a word. When a linguistic generalist translates your written or spoken word, often the translation will fall short, either with the listener or the translator. The result, the translator may not be able to adequately communicate with your target audience. This brings up the third point.

3. Not understanding the target audience - this is often not done to the degree necessary. It requires the intelligence community to often look to the individual level, identifying key influencers and communicators (not always the same individual). The complete understanding of these individuals must be known to be effective. This is seldom done, the blanket approach (i.e. language, religion, education) is often deemed sufficient. It is not.

The book's second most useful insight comes in the chapter on Deception in Intelligence Work. This chapter clearly outlines the necessity of understanding the target.

The last section of the book looks at communications with non-humans. Although interesting, its applicability is somewhat limited. It does reinforce the issue of two different languages trying to find common ground and what is "lost in translation".

Overall, this book is a must for anyone who wishes to understand the complexities of trying to develop a comprehensive IO effort.

Information Operations – Some thoughts from the field

When any discussion gravitates to conducting Information Operations (IO), it invariably ends with the comment that “we haven't seen it do anything of value”. This criticism, although often well founded, generally originates from individual with little or no training in IO. Exposure does not equate to expertise.

Having said that, good intentions do not equate to expertise either. The current state of affairs in the IO community is disjointed. Who is responsible, what is their role, and more fundamentally, what, in fact, is IO?

The last question is paramount to any discussion. IO is not the five pillars/capabilities (as many would believe), but rather, is an effort to influence decision making. In this arena, we are sorely lacking in success. Our efforts have floundered because, DoD wide, there is no standard for conducting IO. This is readily evident within the manpower area as most services treat IO as an additional skill and not a core competency. Until that changes we will continue to see little of the fruits of our efforts.

It is time to codify IO, elevate it to a career path and fully implement its capabilities. We must understand that the five pillars are part of the means of IO and not IO. General Patreaus clearly understood this while at Ft. Leavenworth when he undertook the effort to refocus the Army's approach. While there maybe a great deal of disagreement on his approach, it should give one cause to stop and relook our past efforts. His conclusions are more in line with influencing the decision making process, and that is the ultimate goal of IO.