The question is a simple one. But the answer has not been easy to find. I have asked a number of organizations why they focus at the individual level and not try to develop the network in which the individual operates. The answers are wide ranging, but offer little in the way of insight. While it is important to have information about the individuals who comprise the network, we must also be cognizant of the network. From the network successors to captured or killed leaders arise; individuals who often are not on our radar screen.
I am not advocating giving up on the individual, but a longer term effort, one that focuses on the network, is also needed. Consider it the long term analysis project, the individual the short term. Only when we do the two together can we influence the direction of our adversary.
Network analysis also helps with the Global Pursuit effort. Instead of chasing we should be able to anticipate, the network provides the data necessary to do the predictive analysis necessary to track, locate, and detain Persons of National Interest.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Reading List - Obscure Books
How Real is Real?
Paul Watzlawick
An older book that focuses on communications and the construct of reality. As noted very early in the book, communication creates reality. This is quickly followed by the statement that the most dangerous delusion is there is only one reality. The truth is, there are many versions of reality, some which contradict one another.
The book then goes on to develop this theme, providing evidence that the misunderstandings resulting from poor communications results in two people understanding the same event completely differently.
Examples are frequently provided and the topic is well investigated. A number of these examples I have experienced first hand and can attest to their validity.
So what does this have to do with IO? IO is communications, providing your target audience with information in an effort to influence their decisions. If the communications is poorly done, the translations faulty or the audience not understood,your IO effort will fail.
1. Communications poorly done - the written word suffers the lack of inflection and thus when creating a written IO product it will most likely miss its mark. The emphasis on pronunciation is not available and the reader will put it where he feels it needs to be. This is often complications by the next issue, poor translations.
2. Poor translations - a language is not without both external and internal influences. Regional dialects may change the meaning of a word, or in fact, the usage of a word. When a linguistic generalist translates your written or spoken word, often the translation will fall short, either with the listener or the translator. The result, the translator may not be able to adequately communicate with your target audience. This brings up the third point.
3. Not understanding the target audience - this is often not done to the degree necessary. It requires the intelligence community to often look to the individual level, identifying key influencers and communicators (not always the same individual). The complete understanding of these individuals must be known to be effective. This is seldom done, the blanket approach (i.e. language, religion, education) is often deemed sufficient. It is not.
The book's second most useful insight comes in the chapter on Deception in Intelligence Work. This chapter clearly outlines the necessity of understanding the target.
The last section of the book looks at communications with non-humans. Although interesting, its applicability is somewhat limited. It does reinforce the issue of two different languages trying to find common ground and what is "lost in translation".
Overall, this book is a must for anyone who wishes to understand the complexities of trying to develop a comprehensive IO effort.
Paul Watzlawick
An older book that focuses on communications and the construct of reality. As noted very early in the book, communication creates reality. This is quickly followed by the statement that the most dangerous delusion is there is only one reality. The truth is, there are many versions of reality, some which contradict one another.
The book then goes on to develop this theme, providing evidence that the misunderstandings resulting from poor communications results in two people understanding the same event completely differently.
Examples are frequently provided and the topic is well investigated. A number of these examples I have experienced first hand and can attest to their validity.
So what does this have to do with IO? IO is communications, providing your target audience with information in an effort to influence their decisions. If the communications is poorly done, the translations faulty or the audience not understood,your IO effort will fail.
1. Communications poorly done - the written word suffers the lack of inflection and thus when creating a written IO product it will most likely miss its mark. The emphasis on pronunciation is not available and the reader will put it where he feels it needs to be. This is often complications by the next issue, poor translations.
2. Poor translations - a language is not without both external and internal influences. Regional dialects may change the meaning of a word, or in fact, the usage of a word. When a linguistic generalist translates your written or spoken word, often the translation will fall short, either with the listener or the translator. The result, the translator may not be able to adequately communicate with your target audience. This brings up the third point.
3. Not understanding the target audience - this is often not done to the degree necessary. It requires the intelligence community to often look to the individual level, identifying key influencers and communicators (not always the same individual). The complete understanding of these individuals must be known to be effective. This is seldom done, the blanket approach (i.e. language, religion, education) is often deemed sufficient. It is not.
The book's second most useful insight comes in the chapter on Deception in Intelligence Work. This chapter clearly outlines the necessity of understanding the target.
The last section of the book looks at communications with non-humans. Although interesting, its applicability is somewhat limited. It does reinforce the issue of two different languages trying to find common ground and what is "lost in translation".
Overall, this book is a must for anyone who wishes to understand the complexities of trying to develop a comprehensive IO effort.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Information Operations – Some thoughts from the field
When any discussion gravitates to conducting Information Operations (IO), it invariably ends with the comment that “we haven't seen it do anything of value”. This criticism, although often well founded, generally originates from individual with little or no training in IO. Exposure does not equate to expertise.
Having said that, good intentions do not equate to expertise either. The current state of affairs in the IO community is disjointed. Who is responsible, what is their role, and more fundamentally, what, in fact, is IO?
The last question is paramount to any discussion. IO is not the five pillars/capabilities (as many would believe), but rather, is an effort to influence decision making. In this arena, we are sorely lacking in success. Our efforts have floundered because, DoD wide, there is no standard for conducting IO. This is readily evident within the manpower area as most services treat IO as an additional skill and not a core competency. Until that changes we will continue to see little of the fruits of our efforts.
It is time to codify IO, elevate it to a career path and fully implement its capabilities. We must understand that the five pillars are part of the means of IO and not IO. General Patreaus clearly understood this while at Ft. Leavenworth when he undertook the effort to refocus the Army's approach. While there maybe a great deal of disagreement on his approach, it should give one cause to stop and relook our past efforts. His conclusions are more in line with influencing the decision making process, and that is the ultimate goal of IO.
Monday, October 19, 2009
The Afghan Election
It now appears the world will force a run off in the Afghan election. That is what the world says is necessary, what the opposition says is necessary. But what do the people of Afghanistan say? Little I am sure, based on cultural and historical precedents.
They expected the election to be rigged, they expected Karzai to win. And that is what happened. As far as they are concerned, he remains the Mayor of Kabul. He has little sway over the rank and file, they gave up on him long ago.
Should we be concerned about the legitimacy of the election? To some, and most Afghans, not really. We need to be more in tune with the needs and wants of the population. And they are little enamored with Central Governments. Historically they have gained little from any central government (unless they were of the tribe).
Is a strong legitimate government necessary to defeat the Taliban? I think not. Rather, providing some semblence of security would be better, I think most Afghans would agree. But that means starting in the villages and working our way upwards. This is not something we are willing to do after eight years.
Unless we do, we will end up on the outside. We have the know how and the ability. We must now move to implementation. We must provide the Afghan with justice, we must provide the Afghan with the ability to live his life. We must not make him live it according to our standards, that is an option where we will surely fail.
They expected the election to be rigged, they expected Karzai to win. And that is what happened. As far as they are concerned, he remains the Mayor of Kabul. He has little sway over the rank and file, they gave up on him long ago.
Should we be concerned about the legitimacy of the election? To some, and most Afghans, not really. We need to be more in tune with the needs and wants of the population. And they are little enamored with Central Governments. Historically they have gained little from any central government (unless they were of the tribe).
Is a strong legitimate government necessary to defeat the Taliban? I think not. Rather, providing some semblence of security would be better, I think most Afghans would agree. But that means starting in the villages and working our way upwards. This is not something we are willing to do after eight years.
Unless we do, we will end up on the outside. We have the know how and the ability. We must now move to implementation. We must provide the Afghan with justice, we must provide the Afghan with the ability to live his life. We must not make him live it according to our standards, that is an option where we will surely fail.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Afghanistan - An IO Strategy
As the complexity of Afghanistan is forcing a relook at the strategy, I think it is time to review our Information Operations (IO) effort.
As with combat, we need to rethink and realign our efforts. I am proposing the following three point strategy:
1. We need to have a strategy that operates at the National level, an effort to move the current government toward legitimacy. This includes the reduction of corruption, a main issue with the rural population.
2. We need to have a strategy that operates at the village/district level, one that is designed to stabilize the rural population and allow redevelopment efforts to bear fruit.
3. We need to have a strategy that operates at the operational level, one designed to target the "Taliban".
This three pronged effort must be synchronized across the spectrum and must move forward quickly or it may be impossible to reverse the tide of events within Afghanistan.
As with combat, we need to rethink and realign our efforts. I am proposing the following three point strategy:
1. We need to have a strategy that operates at the National level, an effort to move the current government toward legitimacy. This includes the reduction of corruption, a main issue with the rural population.
2. We need to have a strategy that operates at the village/district level, one that is designed to stabilize the rural population and allow redevelopment efforts to bear fruit.
3. We need to have a strategy that operates at the operational level, one designed to target the "Taliban".
This three pronged effort must be synchronized across the spectrum and must move forward quickly or it may be impossible to reverse the tide of events within Afghanistan.
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
The Future of Information Operations
As we begin to look at the sun set on military efforts in South Asia and the Middle East, the question of what comes next arises. For the Information Operations community, the Regional Commands have already transitioned to self support, with limited outside help from the Services. The former Joint support capability is not as necessary for the day to day operations as was in the past. There was a time limit on this capability and its time is short.
Does that mean there is no need for a Joint capability? The answer is NO. It is time for the Joint capability to mature and evolve. It must shed its apron strings to the operational aspect of Information Operations and begin to provide guidance for the future. What is the state of affairs in South Asia after Afghanistan? What is the impact of the Somali insurgents renewing their ties to Al Qaida? Where is Burma going?
These are just a small fraction of questions that must be addressed by Global Commands as well as the Regional Commands. Who is currently doing this? No one. It needs to be done if we are to plan for the future. Information Operations must also be integrated at the Inter-Agency level.
The most logical step would be the creation of a Joint Inter-Agency Planning Center, a think tank with a small footprint that task organizes to address emerging issues.
Does that mean there is no need for a Joint capability? The answer is NO. It is time for the Joint capability to mature and evolve. It must shed its apron strings to the operational aspect of Information Operations and begin to provide guidance for the future. What is the state of affairs in South Asia after Afghanistan? What is the impact of the Somali insurgents renewing their ties to Al Qaida? Where is Burma going?
These are just a small fraction of questions that must be addressed by Global Commands as well as the Regional Commands. Who is currently doing this? No one. It needs to be done if we are to plan for the future. Information Operations must also be integrated at the Inter-Agency level.
The most logical step would be the creation of a Joint Inter-Agency Planning Center, a think tank with a small footprint that task organizes to address emerging issues.
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Chuck Spinney
Chuck Spinney has a well written article on some of the obstacles facing Western efforts in Afghanistan. This, and a number of others, suggest that a major revision is needed in military efforts in the country. This is supposed to occur under General McChrystal. However, in a recent discussion with individuals that are looking at crafting an Information Operations support plan, I am not seeing his desires translated very well.
The focus must be at the lowest level, that is the village/district. To continue a top down approach as envisioned by these folks, will not satisfy the General's requirement. He is also pushing to have the plan at the lowest possible classification level, that is unclassified, and resistance is building there also. They believe it is ludicrous that it can be done at an unclassified level.
And thus, while there is new thinking at the top, there is old blood below.
Spinney Post:
www.counterpunch.org/spinney07142009.html
Chuck Spinney has a well written article on some of the obstacles facing Western efforts in Afghanistan. This, and a number of others, suggest that a major revision is needed in military efforts in the country. This is supposed to occur under General McChrystal. However, in a recent discussion with individuals that are looking at crafting an Information Operations support plan, I am not seeing his desires translated very well.
The focus must be at the lowest level, that is the village/district. To continue a top down approach as envisioned by these folks, will not satisfy the General's requirement. He is also pushing to have the plan at the lowest possible classification level, that is unclassified, and resistance is building there also. They believe it is ludicrous that it can be done at an unclassified level.
And thus, while there is new thinking at the top, there is old blood below.
Spinney Post:
www.counterpunch.org/spinney07142009.html
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